Locking horns in the Budget Committee

On Tuesday the Budget Committee of the Lower House of the Diet convened; the Budget Committee, of course, is the main stage for clashes between government and opposition, and will provide Mr. Fukuda with plenty of time to elaborate on his policy plans, if he indeed has any.

While there are a host of economic issues that will be discussed — there will no doubt be some spirited exchanges on the pensions issue — the debate over a new bill authorizing the MSDF mission in the Indian will indubitably overshadow everything else. The debate has been transformed somewhat with Mr. Ozawa's declaration last week that he has no problem with Japan's sending ground troops as part of ISAF even as he maintains that the refueling mission is unconstitutional. Mainichi asks what Mr. Ozawa's motive is for purposing this new step, but, as I argued last week, the new proposal should by no means be considered inconsistent with Mr. Ozawa's history. In fact, it probably marks a return to the Ozawa that earned the plaudits of Americans for his advocacy of a "normal" Japan. The government has fiercely dismissed Mr. Ozawa's proposal — Defense Minister Ishiba went so far as to describe Mr. Ozawa as "being callous about the lives of SDF members," which seems a bit rich coming from the self-described "defense otaku."

Indeed, as Mainichi wrote regarding Mr. Ishiba's rebuttal and Kan Naoto's defense of Mr. Ozawa, "We now have the 'topsy-turvy' [the article uses nejire, literally 'twisted,' but I think topsy-turvy gets closer to the idea] spectacle of Mr. Ishiba's advancing traditional 'defend the constitution' arguments and Mr. Kan's advancing arguments in favor of the proactive dispatch of troops abroad."

The government is not likely to cave on its plan for sticking to refueling at sea. In the Diet today, Mr. Fukuda reiterated that the MSDF mission is constitutional, and no doubt consciously contrasted the government's position with the DPJ's by saying, "This action does not entail the use of force prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution, and thus is not in violation of the Constitution." Indeed, Mr. Ozawa may have made it easier for the government to pass its new law, and the LDP will presumably push to contrast the government's "responsible" position with Mr. Ozawa's "reckless" position at every turn. Not surprisingly, former LDP secretary-general Nakagawa Hidenao called for a direct debate between Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Ozawa focused on this issue.

I have a hard time seeing how Mr. Ozawa will get his way on the issue. Indeed, he may have guaranteed that the government gets its way, with full public support, by suggesting an armed approach that is not only unlikely to receive the support of the Japanese people, but also likely to draw considerable opposition from within the DPJ. Even while being right — and I think he is, because contributing to ISAF is exactly what Japan should be doing if it's serious about normalizing its security policy — I can't see this gambit as serving any purpose other than signaling to observers that Mr. Ozawa and his party aren't the do-nothing pacifists that they have been painted as since coming out against the extension of the anti-terror law. Accordingly, within the DPJ the "realistic" option for an alternative bill is proposing civilian aid to PRTs, which means that Japanese personnel will still need to be defended by some other country's military.

That said, the government still has work to do on building support for its new bill, as much within the LDP as within the government at large. Mainichi suggests that some members of the LDP are concerned about the threat posed to civilian control by the new law's waiving of the requirement that both houses approve the dispatch. And one of the central questions I have about the Budget Committee hearings is whether the DPJ will be able to get some traction on the issue of Japanese fuel being used by US warships participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Foreign Minister Komura has stated once again — based on information received from the US — that no Japanese fuel was diverted, but I don't think this will end the discussion, nor should it. The DPJ will comb through whatever it can find, in the hope of getting a snowball effect in public opposition to the government, much like it achieved in the spring with revelations about lost pensions.

Japan keeps free riding

Today marks the first anniversary of North Korea's presumed subterranean nuclear test, which initially prompted criticism and sanctions from the international community but has since — in some way — led to renewed attention from the US and thus the latest progress towards denuclearized North Korea.

One year ago, of course, Japan was praised for its swift reaction to the test, imposing a broad spectrum of economic sanctions on its pariah neighbor.

And now? The Japanese government has renewed its sanctions, which prohibit the import of all North Korean goods and bans North Korean ships from Japanese ports, for another six months. The reason, according to Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura, is that there has been inadequate progress on the abductions issue (no surprise there).

Based on the Japanese government's actions, one could easily forget that four other countries have equal or greater stakes in resolving the situation on the Korean peninsula. And so Japan continues to free ride on the efforts and sacrifices of others, not least the US, its most important ally. The US — or more specifically Chris Hill, with the backing of Secretary Rice and the president — is pushing hard and is actually willing to deal with a regime that not too along was a charter member of the "Axis of Evil." Japan, the country with the most to fear from North Korea's arsenal, is also contributing the least to efforts to implement an agreement to neutralize it.

Looks like Mr. Fukuda will not be bucking the LDP's conservatives after all — not altogether surprising given his vulnerable position.

Meanwhile, I think the difference between Japan's approaches to the North Korea and Afghanistan issues is revealing. On the former, Japan is, of course, pursuing a hard line independent of the US; in addressing what its leaders (and many of its people) believe to be a multi-dimensional threat to national security, Japan is acting pretty much alone, with little or no consideration of its international reputation or the desires of its partners. In regard to the latter, the government claims to be acting out of deference both to the US but also to the international community, especially the countries participating in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. At the same time, however, the Japanese government supports doing the minimum necessary to earn the respect of other nations.

Accordingly, for all the talk of Japan's normalization, it turns out to be not only uneven across time — it has experienced lags and backsliding — but also across space: Japan is not prepared to risk anything substantial in an area in which its interests are not directly affected. This impression is reinforced when one considers that the implicit reasoning behind Japan's support for the Iraq war, for example, was that supporting the US would firm up US support for Japan vis-a-vis North Korea.

Of course, all this amounts to Japan's being a fairly typical middling power, concerned more about its fundamental security interests — which necessarily involve its periphery — than about abstract concerns for global order and stability. Japan's normalization will likely continue to be conditional, which is worth keeping in mind when reading more hysterical accounts of Japan's changing security policy.

Is a snap election within the next seven months likely?

Publicly, Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ leadership remain determined to push for a general election. At a meeting of prefectural chapter heads last week, Mr. Ozawa spoke of intensifying the party's preparations for a general election and outlined the DPJ's four principles for a general election campaign: (1) not standing candidates in all 300 electoral districts, (2) working with other opposition parties to support candidates, (3) not backing — without exception — candidates running solely in PR blocs, and (4) giving party nominations to candidates from other parties (a technical distinction that could influence how a candidate is presented to voters).

My sources inside the DPJ tell me that the mood within the party still anticipates a general election within the next seven months, with members divided as to whether it will be before the end of 2007 or in the springtime, following the passage of the budget. And there has yet to be any serious dissension from the party line that calls for pressuring the government to call an early election. But how long can that last?

Given the nature of Japanese campaigning, a party cannot start preparing for a general election too soon — this applies as much to incumbents as to challengers. (I saw Hayashi Jun, a Koizumi kid first elected in 2005 as a representative for Kanagawa-4, campaigning before generally indifferent passersby outside Kamakura station last week.) Not surprisingly, Koga Makoto, the LDP's new election strategy chairman, also set to work last week on preparing the LDP for a general election, but gave no indication that he expects it to be anytime before September 2009.

I am increasingly inclined to agree with MTC on the unlikelihood of a general election until the very last minute, unless the LDP once again finds its popularity in free fall (as I think it was before the July election and in the weeks following it). If the Fukuda government squanders the opportunity afforded it by the Japanese people, who have clearly given the LDP one more chance to get things right, I cannot help but wonder whether the government might cave and call an election, perhaps finding that delaying would only contribute to the free fall. But I expect that under Mr. Fukuda the party may be able to avoid the free fall that occurred under Mr. Abe, not because there isn't the possibility of scandals or inappropriate remarks by cabinet ministers, but because I don't think the prime minister will let things spiral out of control — and if he manages to act on his rhetoric about fixing the problems of reform, he might buy enough credit with the public to ensure that he can escape the consequences of ministerial incompetence or malfeasance.

In the meantime, though, I think Mr. Koizumi's characterization of the new relationship between the LDP and DPJ — as explicated by MTC here — may prove to be exactly right. As MTC wrote: "At election time and in the runup to the selection of a new prime minister, the factions sharpened and inflated their policy differences. However, once the elections were over or a new prime minister was voted into office, factions allowed these seemingly life-or-death differences to fade. Instead, what became important was finding the means to cooperate on passing legislation and equitably dividing the political spoils."

After the sharpened partisan conflict that has surrounded the extension of the MSDF mission subsides — with the DPJ increasingly likely to face defeat on the bill — Mr. Ozawa and his party may retreat and then return to the table to talk. With the lessening of partisan tensions, calls for an early election might subside as 2007 turns into 2008, and with less focus on an imminent election, the LDP and DPJ might actually get around to legislating in the manner suggested by Mr. Koizumi, at least until late 2008 when thoughts turn to election strategy once again.

All of this means is that like in intraparty LDP competition under the 1955 system, election contests will hinge less on policy differences than on intangibles (in urban Japan)— the popularity and charisma of party heads and the candidates themselves — and tangibles (in rural Japan) — the money brought home, or not, by the incumbent.

The democracy question

In light of the quashing of the "Saffron Revolution" in Burma and the Japanese government's feeble response to the violence, which took the life of a Japanese citizen, it is probably safe to declare MOFA's "value oriented diplomacy" to create an "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" dead.

But with Japan's following behind Washington in backtracking on democracy promotion, it is worth asking whether there is a danger of going too far in the other direction. Should the developed democracies be in the business of bolstering nascent democracies and goading authoritarian states to democratize? If so, how can they deliver concrete results?

To the former, Stanley Fish writes in the New York Times about participating the making of a BBC program called "Why Democracy," for which he answered ten questions about democracy in the contemporary world. Some of the questions Fish rightly dismisses as fatuous, but there are several questions that get to the heart of the problem when considering whether developed democracies can help others along the same path. Indeed, Fish wonders whether Fukuyama's "End of History" democratic teleology is accurate, and wonders whether perhaps other peoples might value other things above democracy. In other words, it's not that some nations are anti-democratic but rather that they simply value other things more (religiously ordered society, traditional ways of living, etc.). I think this is an appropriate question in light of Japan's own democratic experience. Do the Japanese people value democracy more than the range of "myths" that constitute modern Japanese nationhood?

(This, of course, transforms that perennial topic of bulletin board discussions about Japan — is Japan a democracy? — into a different matter entirely. Democracy isn't a matter of steps on a ladder but shades along a gradient.)

Accordingly, if democratization means not pulling a people up a ladder in the direction of "democracy" but something messier, more rooted in culture and tradition, what can be done about the fifty-eight and forty-five countries classified by Freedom House in 2007 as partly free and not free respectively? Presumably Iraq has, for the moment, discredited the idea of armed democratization — "The End of History" on horseback — although, as Tony Judt notes, the "liberal hawks" of 2003 are finding their voice again and their colleagues on the right are probably only slightly chastened by the Iraq disaster. But are there policy tools short of outright war capable of instigating a transition to democracy?

I'm personally partial to initiatives like those managed by the semi-public US National Endowment for Democracies (NED) and partner organizations, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) (the latter two are loosely affiliated with the Democratic and Republican parties). These organizations are focused on capacity-building for democracies, training participants (mainly but not only parties) in how to function in a democracy and helping to strengthen public and private institutions necessary for a liberal democracy. Their approach is less visible than high-profile official initiatives and more cognizant of the challenges associated with democratization, acknowledging the time it takes for a society to democratize, the need for robust civil society institutions, and the necessity of adapting institutions to local conditions. It also recognizes that democracy has to come from within; the citizens of a country have to want it themselves. Democracy cannot be a gift given from abroad, but material and intellectual support for those who want to democratize can.

The key may be, as Noah Feldman argues in the New York Times (apologies for this NYT-heavy post), toning down the rhetoric of democratization — used heavily by the Bush administration — that exposes the US to charges of hypocrisy or impotence for failing to live up to its rhetorical commitments, but not abandoning the cause of democratization. Like Feldman, I think there is value to developed democracies using their wealth and power to support democratization, which, as he notes, is unique for great powers: "Empires inevitably fall, and when they do, history judges them for the legacies they leave behind. It would be both sacrilegious and ahistorical to believe that our power will last for eternity. If liberty and self-government are among our legacies, then our strength will not have been squandered."

But the developed democracies need to be aware of their own limits, both material and strategic, and not let their rhetoric run ahead of those limits. There can be no hard and fast rules for when to lean on authoritarian governments and when to cooperate with them — it will take prudence and wisdom on the part of developed governments, coupled with long-term, low-level support for the forces of democratization in non-democratic states.

To return to Japan's "value diplomacy," Tokyo might, in fact, be quite good at this quieter, more patient democratization. Perhaps the DPJ should set up its own version of the National Democratic Institute and expose the hollowness of the government's rhetoric.

Apologies to my readers

I must apologize for the dearth of posts in recent days. I have, unfortunately, been busy making preparations for my imminent departure from Japan on Tuesday — my visa is set to expire next week, so it's off to New York City to finish Ph.D. applications and contemplate ways to return to Japan as soon as possible.

If anyone has any ideas (offers, sinecures, etc.) for how I can return to Japan quickly, I am eager to hear them.

Now back to your regularly scheduled programming...

Observing Japan in other media

Subscribers to the Far Eastern Economic Review can read my take on Mr. Fukuda's prospects in the October issue (online here).

(And readers of FEER's dead-tree edition will be able to see my face in the table of contents.)

Catch-22 for the DPJ

Jun Okumura comments on an Asahi article — available here — that discusses former Prime Minister Koizumi's speech to a meeting of the Machimura faction, in which he described the DPJ as being akin to the LDP anti-mainstream. Now, this might strike some as a strange, but it's actually an apt description for the current political situation, especially since the LDP has largely united behind Mr. Fukuda, leaving an opening for an anti-mainstream group.

Winning the Upper House election might have been the worst thing to happen to the DPJ, because now the party is trapped between the demands of being an opposition party — doing whatever possible to hinder the government and raising the rhetoric to sharpen the differences between government and opposition — and the responsibilities inherent in controlling one of the chambers of the Diet. The latter problem is compounded by the weakness of the Upper House, which means that the DPJ can't use its majority to pass legislation without cooperating with the LDP, even while the LDP possesses the trump card of its Lower House supermajority, enabling it to outmaneuver the DPJ when necessary.

With Mr. Abe in the Kantei, an aggressive DPJ strategy that abjured from cooperation in the hopes of forcing an early election might have worked, exacerbating internal disagreements within the LDP and perhaps sparking a rebellion reminiscent of the Kato insurrection (only this time successful). But the same strategy will not work facing the wily Mr. Fukuda, not least because the less likely a snap election seems, the more the DPJ will be expected to use its Upper House strength constructively. Indeed, the more confrontational the DPJ is, the easier it may be for the LDP to use its supermajority to override the Upper House without fear of public backlash (and thus put off a general election until September 2009).

What should Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ do? They might have no choice but to act like the LDP anti-mainstream — act as part of the government, but hold those with power responsible for their mistakes and use the power that they do have from controlling the Upper House to shape the agenda as much as possible and extract concessions from Mr. Fukuda, who apparently is willing to give them up.

Perhaps this arrangement will fall into place following the battle of the MSDF mission, but one way or another the DPJ has to stop hoping for an early election and actually beginning meeting Mr. Fukuda's flexibility and nuance with flexibility and nuance of their own.

(I have developed this idea at greater length in an article in the forthcoming November/December issue of J@pan Inc.)

Komeito's emerging role?

With the special session of the Diet session now in full swing, both the LDP and the DPJ are learning how to function in an unprecedented political environment. Barring the government's somehow folding and calling an early election — essentially giving up its Lower House supermajority, its one trump card — both parties will have to establish new rules of the game, a modus vivendi that will enable them to cooperate on some legislation even while struggling to win the upper hand in the battle for public support.

Because there is plenty of ground for the two parties to work together. Take, for example, the issue of a monthly child allowance, which was one of the DPJ's campaign promises in July. The DPJ has finalized its proposal, calling for a monthly child allowance of 26,000 yen until the child completes junior high school, without means testing for parents' income. Mr. Fukuda, based on his maiden speech in the Diet, surely wouldn't disagree with a some kind of proposal like this. What would stop the LDP and the DPJ from cooperating on this issue, given that they agree on the principle? They might quibble over money and conditions, but that's politics.

And so I find remarks from Mr. Kitagawa, Komeito secretary-general, of interest. Mr. Kitagawa suggested that if DPJ legislation is good, "We think it will be good to appeal to the LDP. We want to strive for a flexible stance." Komeito could be a useful actor, prevailing on both the DPJ and the LDP to come to terms on behalf of good policy. Indeed, after a miserable performance in July's election, Komeito is suddenly in a good position. After being battered under Mr. Abe, in Mr. Fukuda they have a prime minister who appreciates them and in a tense political environment they may have an important role to play in forging compromises on policy.

Boots for ships?

The DPJ, JCP, SDP, and Kokumin Shinto collectively informed the government on Tuesday in a meeting of Kokutai chairs that they cannot cooperate with the government on the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean, due to the lack of a provision mandating prior approval from the Diet. Indeed, at a press conference on Tuesday Mr. Ozawa made a point of questioning the constitutionality of the mission.

But Mr. Ozawa has also opened the door to a compromise with the government.

How? Well, it turns out that Mr. Ozawa wants not just civilian aid workers on the ground in Afghanistan, but GSDF troops contributing to ISAF efforts to maintain order in Afghanistan. He even suggested, according to Mainichi, that GSDF troops participating in ISAF might be able to use their weapons if necessary.

Although the article hinted darkly at "objections" within the DPJ, Mr. Ozawa's comments are still of interest. Is the government so hung up on having ships in the Indian Ocean that it won't even consider the idea of GSDF troops on the ground, a contribution that would probably be even more appreciated internationally than the refueling operation? If so, why? I wonder if this isn't a matter of wanting to commit in the least costly way while still pocketing appreciation from abroad for Japan's contributions. It's not like Japan's risking much at the moment. (For all we know, the MSDF sailors are having dance parties at sea.) Is it a kind of rigid legalism on the part of MOFA — the US wants ships, we deliver ships? Is it a fear of the casualties that could result from sending GSDF troops to Afghanistan could derail Japan's "normalization"?

Meanwhile, Mr. Ozawa's remarks should dispel the wild mischaracterizations of Mr. Ozawa that have been flung about over the past couple of months, mostly in the western press. (Try this recent one by Richard Halloran.) The guy's no anti-American pacifist — he's just struggling to keep together a party riven with disagreements on foreign policy. Accordingly, if a LDP-DPJ compromise with the government were to emerge on the grounds of a GSDF dispatch to Afghanistan, I would be curious about whether the DPJ caucus in the Upper House, which strikes me as having a more Socialist coloration, would follow along meekly or whether it would cause trouble for their party's Fearless Leader.

The US, entrapped no longer?

The latest meeting of the six-party talks in Beijing is currently on hold, but that hasn't stopped Kim Kye Gwan, North Korea's plenipotentiary in the talks, from telling the press that the US is prepared to include a concrete timeline for removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Is Japan ready for the US to begin moving ahead on normalization with North Korea, despite George's persistent reassurances to Shinzo that the US wants the abductee problem solved first? I swear, the Japanese government better not point to Secretary of State Rice's saying last week that the US will take Japan's views on this into consideration as evidence that Japan has been betrayed.

But seriously, before anyone gets too misty-eyed about the greatness of the US-Japan alliance, it is necessary to ask about the health of an alliance in which the two allies have been unable to speak publicly about the growing gulf in their positions on an important issue. Mr. Abe, of course, bears some of the blame for the serious leap from Japan's side that the US is on the brink of taking — he wanted to talk abductions, and the US government told him exactly what he wanted to hear, over and over again.

But the US has been a bad ally in just going along with Japan's abductee obsession, knowing full well — at least for most of this year — that given a choice between an even remotely satisfactory deal with North Korea and Japan's satisfaction on the abductions issue, it would choose the Pyongyang deal.

I wonder if this is a function of reverse entrapment. Perhaps the US, having gotten everything it could have hoped for (and more, considering that Armitage and others didn't expect Japan to send troops to Iraq) from Japan over the past six years in matters related to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, found itself unable to criticize Japan on a matter of extreme importance to Tokyo. Of course, the underlying power relationship being what it is, the US may find it a bit easier to escape from being entrapped by Tokyo.

So brace yourself for the shock that has been so long in coming there can't possibly be anyone who will still be shocked by it. (Nevertheless, Will and Shokun! will still be full of vituperative essays about how Japan has been betrayed by the US.)

UPDATE — The can's been kicked down the road again. The latest joint statement included no specific terms for removing North Korea from the list. All it means is that Mr. Fukuda now has time to close the gap between the US and Japanese positions.

The LDP readies its bill

On the heels of Mr. Fukuda's maiden speech to the Diet, the government has outlined a new bill on the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean and will begin working with relevant cabinet ministers and within the governing coalition to hammer out a final draft, before appealing to the DPJ to cooperate.

Perhaps, then, Jun Okumura is right: a perfunctory effort to get the DPJ to sign on, then a quick push through the House of Representatives by mid-October (Jun said October 16th), meaning that the sixty-day waiting period would end sometime in December. It seems that the government will be unable to avoid extending the Diet session into December.

The terms of the government's draft, accordingly to Asahi, are much more limited than the special measures law, stripping the mission down to its refueling core (instead of also being permitted to do searches and disaster relief). Acknowledging opposition criticism, the government will provide information on the mission at fixed intervals — and it will acknowledge the farcical UN resolution as a basis for action. The LDP wants the bill to last two years, but apparently Komeito would prefer only one.

But any differences within the coalition will presumably be ironed out. It seems that Mr. Fukuda may be able to achieve what Mr. Abe couldn't, with minimal turbulence. The DPJ will ask its questions and demand documents — it has already begun its parliamentary inquest — but it won't be able to do much more than delay the inevitable. Mr. Ozawa may still be able to spin it as a victory of some kind, saying that he stood up to both the government and the US and refused to cave, but it seems that it won't serve as the rallying cry that perhaps the DPJ leadership intended when it took this stance after the election.

In other words, in with a bang, out with a whimper.

A very typical scandal

In case anyone thinks that the DPJ will buy the dodge attempted by CCS Machimura on The Sunday Project — discussed by Jun Okumura in this post — this post by Nagashima Akihisa should disabuse you of that notion.

Mr. Machimura attempted to shift the blame to the US for reports that US warships used Japanese-provided fuel for activities related to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

As seems typical for Mr. Nagashima's blog posts, he is "dumbfounded" by Mr. Machimura's remarks, suggesting that in all likelihood the government knew exactly what was going on in the Indian Ocean.

This "scandal" has the makings of other Japanese scandals, with unanswered question following unanswered question (i.e., the question of whether Japan provided 200,000 or 800,000 tons of fuel), which of course justifies the position taken by Mr. Nagashima and other DPJ hawks that the problem isn't the mission, but the government's failure to provide adequate information about the MSDF's activities. This whole "Iraq or Afghanistan" question has probably destroyed whatever opportunity remained of the government's using the anti-terror bill to divide the DPJ, if such an opportunity even remained — apparently the government doesn't even have the information that the DPJ wants (and if it's playing dumb, well, that's even more inexcusable).

In the meantime, the DPJ continues to support a role on the ground in Afghanistan, doing "DDR": disarmament, demobilization, and reconstruction. Shadow Defense Minister Asao reiterated the DPJ's support for a government plan to put personnel — presumably civilians — on the ground in Afghanistan in support of DDR activities.

I have to disagree with Jun Okumura on point related to this, however. I see no way for this bill to pass this year. Depending on how quickly the Lower House acts on a new bill, we're still looking at a two-month waiting period before the Lower House can vote for the bill again, even longer if the Diet session isn't extended to last into December or the new year. I find it hard to believe that the DPJ won't use the full sixty days to embarrass the government, questioning witness after witness after witness about the mission.

The Fukuda cabinet might be able to raise the costs to the DPJ of opting for this strategy, but I think that will depend on the height of the ceiling for public support for this mission. The recent polls on this matter show that the support the government enjoys is soft — of the "can't be helped" variety rather than the "absolutely must do this" variety.

The end of Abe politics (for now)

Prime Minister Fukuda delivered his maiden speech to the Diet this afternoon, reopening legislative business after an unscheduled three-week abeyance.

If Mr. Fukuda was trying to differentiate himself from his successor, he succeeded admirably. Mr. Abe's way of politics was not just ideological, but inflexibly ideological. For Mr. Abe, it was always "my way or the highway" — but, perhaps to his surprise, it was the Japanese people who told him to beat it. Mr. Fukuda will, as expected, not be nearly as intransigent. (Sankei says exactly this, noting that Mr. Fukuda's "color" will be different from both Mr. Koizumi's "theatrical politics" and Mr. Abe's conservatism.)

The speech — available here — redounds with what will be the cardinal themes of the Fukuda cabinet: trust, sincerity, cooperation, reform.

The longest sections, perhaps not surprisingly, concern social inequalities and foreign policy.

On the inequality between urban and rural Japan, Mr. Fukuda acknowledges the existence of a "vicious cycle" whereby rural regions have stagnated economically, making them less attractive to the young, which has perpetuated economic stagnation and "grayed" whole regions of the country. He committed his government to accelerate studies of how to regenerate the regions, including transferring more tax authority and considering the agglomeration of prefectures into seven or nine super-prefectures (from forty-seven). And he acknowledged the importance of protecting small farmers and small- and medium-sized businesses — traditional pillars of LDP support — but was short on the how. Something tells me that the denizens of the shuttered shopping streets visited by Mr. Fukuda during the LDP presidential campaign are hungering for something more than words, although Mr. Fukuda's acknowledgment of the problem is a step above Mr. Abe. At the same time, however, he reaffirmed once again his commitment to reform — so it remains to be seen how he proposes to go about solving the "light and shadow" problem with reform, discussed at length in this article (two parts) in Genron NPO by Kato Koichi.

On foreign policy, he called attention to Japan's role in supporting the peace of the world, and highlighted the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean and the North Korea problems as his government's highest priority foreign policy problems. On the former, he called attention to requests from the UN and countries participating in the reconstruction of Afghanistan that Japan extend its mission — and said, "I will expend all my energy explaining to the people and the Diet the importance of continuing the mission without a break, in order to receive their understanding." On the latter, he waffled, talking about the importance of the six-party talks to the peace of the region, but also speaking of the importance of ensuring that all the abductees are returned home. In other words, he ducked the looming question of whether Japan will actually begin playing a constructive role in the talks as they move ahead.

The rest of the foreign policy section was spent reassuring others. To the US, he pledged to strengthen bilateral trust in the relationship. To the people of Okinawa, he pledged to listen to their opinions on the realignment of US forces. To China, he pledged to continue the strategic relationship grounded in shared interests, and to South Korea, he pledged to forge a more trusting relationship in the near future. To ASEAN, he pledged greater economic cooperation, and to the WTO, he pledged to work towards a compromise that concludes the Doha Round. And he renewed the Japanese government's campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

While the speech is about as vague as Mr. Abe's maiden speech to the Diet around this time last year, there is no question that Mr. Fukuda's priorities are wholly different from Mr. Abe's. Mr. Abe's vision of a "beautiful Japan" was delusional, and created a false impression internationally of a vigorous, energetic Japan rising. Mr. Fukuda acknowledges the reality of contemporary Japan as a deeply insecure place, whose people are worried about the future of their society and their livelihoods as they age. He doesn't seem to have many concrete answers for how to deal with those insecurities, but acknowledging that said insecurities exist is an important first step. He also recognizes that Japanese society has to change, and that change doesn't mean going backward, a recognition sure to make conservatives in the LDP apoplectic. He said, for example, "I am wrestling with the implementation of a 'men and women joint-participation society' in which all individuals, both men and women, can utilize their abilities and personalities and share joys and responsibilities. In this society [women] will be able to take sufficient maternity leave and then return to work, so to maintain an environment in which children can be born and raised safely." Not exactly a radical vision compared to innovations that have been implemented in workplaces in other developed countries, but it's radical enough for an LDP prime minister.

This is a good reminder of what Mr. Fukuda faces as he moves forward. He not only has to try to cooperate with a DPJ that has given few signs of wanting to cooperate, but he will likely have to fend off attacks from ideologues in his own party, who — as MTC reminds us — are still in fighting spirit, perhaps even more than ever after their man was hounded from the Kantei. (Undoubtedly, they will be raging about the absence of a mention of constitution revision in Mr. Fukuda's address; indeed, after a year of Mr. Abe, it's strange to see a policy address that, however vague, actually discusses matters of national concern.) In case anyone needs a reminder that the LDP's conservatives are still ready for action, bear in mind that Mr. Aso has already begun touring the country to build up grassroots support for his next run for the LDP presidency.

Whether or not Mr. Fukuda lasts long enough to make any progress on solving Japan's problems, it is refreshing to have a prime minister who is both aware of what the country's problems really are and willing to admit that he doesn't have all the answers.

More on DPJ parliamentary strategy

Following on Asahi's report on Mr. Ozawa's order to the DPJ to prepare a storm of legislation, Sankei provides a fuller survey of the DPJ's arsenal as it prepares for battle against Mr. Fukuda.

One pillar is, of course, submitting a host of legislation to the Upper House. Sankei notes that in at least one case, the political funds control law, Mr. Ozawa is trying to break the LDP-Komeito coalition — but the daylight between the LDP and Komeito on this and other issues may be shrinking as Mr. Fukuda sets about repairing a fundamental prop of the current government that was woefully undermined by Mr. Abe.

The second two pillars are more obstructionist, concerning the use of parliamentary investigative rights and censure motions (and nixing personnel decisions) in the Upper House.

The former is the key to the DPJ's making the Upper House the place where government policies go to die (or at least gather dust). The investigative powers will give the DPJ the power to request documents and call witnesses, at least in the committees it oversees. To delay government legislation and to undermine the effectiveness of the Lower House supermajority — cumbersome to have to wait two months to pass each bill, after all — it will undoubtedly call witness after witness.

On personnel questions, the DPJ can throw a spanner into the works by nixing personnel appointments that require the approval of both houses, such as the presidency of the Bank of Japan. As for censure motions, the DPJ had considered bringing a censure motion against Mr. Abe, but he resigned too early into the Diet session for the DPJ to deliver on this threat. The article suggests that the DPJ recognizes that at this point a censure motion isn't a realistic option; for the moment, they're stuck with Mr. Fukuda.

But for that reason I'm not clear on what Mr. Ozawa is aiming to accomplish. The DPJ cannot pass laws without the government's approval; the government can, if necessary, pass laws without the Upper House. With his "legislative storm," Mr. Ozawa may be trying to call the government's bluff: "You say you want to cooperate — well, how about these laws?" But what if Mr. Fukuda and the LDP cooperate? I think the LDP probably has the most to gain from cooperation, hence the persistent calls for a grand coalition. The DPJ, meanwhile, wants the government to appear out of touch and lethargic. In game theory terms, under cooperation the DPJ doesn't exactly "lose," but the payoff is smaller — it gains less than it would in a situation where the government is inactive, while the DPJ is actively passing legislation in the Upper House. But that scenario seems to be increasingly unlikely. Mr. Fukuda is certainly aware of what's at stake, and will do whatever it takes to regain the public trust, including swallowing what for some LDP members is the bitter pill of cooperation with the DPJ.

Is Mr. Ozawa certain that he has the public behind him? Or are the Japanese people weary and actually willing to give Mr. Fukuda a chance to succeed? If the latter, the DPJ's use of obstructionist tools in the hope of triggering an early election — Mr. Ozawa's "Jiminto delenda est" strategy — could quite easily backfire.

I am by no means saying that the DPJ shouldn't be submitting legislation to the Diet; having won its near-majority, of course it should. But the question is one of intent. Is the DPJ submitting legislation simply to pressure the government, or is it submitting legislation because it actually wants to see laws passed? If the latter, it has no choice but to cooperate with the LDP-Komeito coalition, meaning, like I argued before, that if the DPJ actually wants positive legislative achievements before the next election, it has no choice but to cooperate with the government, which will paradoxically lessen the electoral significance of said legislative achievements.

Legislative storm!

As Nagatacho waits for Mr. Fukuda's maiden speech to the Diet, which will presumably outline how his government intends to proceed in the remaining weeks (months?) of the current special session of the Diet, the DPJ has decided to strike first on the legislative front.

Following Mr. Ozawa's orders to the DPJ's Next Cabinet, the DPJ is executing what Asahi calls a "storm of legislation."

"This offensive," writes Asahi, "originates in Mr. Ozawa's 'command.'"

"On the morning of the 26th, Mr. Ozawa spoke on the phone with his inner circle on 'how to proceed on legislation.' Reporting on the problem of 'leading without followers,' on the same day he attended a meeting of the DPJ's 'Next Cabinet.' Calling on responsible NC members one by one, he said, 'If nothing is submitted, the DPJ's popularity will fall to earth' and strongly pressed for all sorts of legislation to be submitted to the Diet during the current session."

The ledger of bills includes a bill to revise the system of support for disaster victims and post-disaster reconstruction, a bill on support for the disabled, an emergency countermeasures bill for hepatitis, and a pensions system reform bill.

Does this pronouncement suggest a reduced emphasis on pressing for dissolution of the House of Representatives and a snap election, an election for which the DPJ may not even be ready? (The DPJ just concluded a "regime change" pact with the PNP and SDP, with provisions for DPJ support for 20-25 PNP, SDP, and independent candidates, and a perusal of the DPJ website shows that the party has not finalized its Lower House nominations yet — a process which Mr. Ozawa reputedly wants to micromanage, though I can't help but wonder what kind of time he has to review each candidate for the LH.)

Perhaps the increasingly likely prospects of a general election — a Mainichi poll found 74% of respondents desiring a general election within the next year, and Mr. Fukuda has certainly made clear that he's not averse to the idea — have focused Mr. Ozawa's mind on the problem of how to sell the party in an election that could be just around the corner, particularly in the face of a more competent government. But the "legislative storm" could backfire, in the sense that any legislation the DPJ manages to pass will be the result of cooperation with the government, leaving the DPJ to fight with the LDP over who deserves the credit (and criticizing the government for bills not passed).

This could have the opposite effect from what advocates of a two-party system have hoped for: rather than having election campaigns focused on policy, divided government could result, at least this time around, in a campaign rooted in the personalities of candidates and the party leaders and vapid slogans about advancing reform and castigating the other as "the old LDP." (With Ozawa as the leader of the DPJ, a Fukuda-Ozawa showdown could actually come down to this last point.)

A tailwind, but where to?

In a year that has been nothing but hurricane-strength headwinds for the LDP, the party has for the first time in months a wind at its back.

The talk of the day is, of course, the first opinion polls on the Fukuda cabinet, which show, across the board, a considerable boost for Mr. Fukuda and the LDP. Yomiuri found 57.5% support for the new cabinet, Mainichi also found 57% support (apparently the same support Fukuda the elder had upon his inauguration), Nikkei found 59% support, and Asahi, not surprisingly, found 53% support. Given the depths to which the Abe cabinet had sunk, I think these numbers are about as good as the LDP could have expected. The underlying weariness after the disappointments of the year of Abe has not dissipated, but the voters are at least willing to give Mr. Fukuda a chance, even if a majority of Asahi's respondents think Mr. Fukuda marks a return to the old LDP.

Mr. Fukuda, due to give his maiden speech to the Diet on October 1st, is already giving signs that, like Mr. Koizumi, he understands that the root of Japan's economic and social problems is political. At a meeting with senior bureaucrats today, Mr. Fukuda emphasized that without the trust and confidence of the people, it will be impossible to execute reforms. Restoring confidence will depend on (to continue the maritime metaphor) Mr. Fukuda's running a tight ship, preserving discipline in his cabinet and demanding that his government be accountable to the people. That alone will not guarantee success, but it will make Mr. Ozawa's life that much more difficult.

You have the public and your party behind you Mr. Fukuda. Now what?

Like father, like son

Following this post from last week, this article in Mainichi today caught my eye:

Fukuda cabinet: many common points between father and son

Coming to the plate in a "ninth inning, two outs, bases loaded" crisis

The article proceeds to discuss the number of similarities between the circumstances faced by Fukuda the elder and Fukuda the younger, not least the problems involved with reports of widespread corruption and recovering from a major electoral defeat that empowered the opposition.

But, the article notes, if the LDP couldn't afford any errors thirty years ago, it has even less margin for error now, hence Mr. Fukuda's adoption of the catchphrase "last stand cabinet" to describe his government. As Mr. Fukuda said yesterday, "If we take even one false step, the LDP will lose power."

I wonder if the sense of crisis Mr. Fukuda has himself tried to evoke isn't slightly hyperbolic. The LDP is undoubtedly in dire straits — I've said as much myself. But one mistake? I think Mr. Fukuda will find that having given himself some breathing room in the early going, he will have some room to push an agenda — and make many voters think twice about whether they really want Mr. Ozawa to be the prime minister. Of course, he will still have to avoid making the amateurish mistakes that doomed Mr. Abe. But then again, Mr. Fukuda will benefit from the favorable contrast with his predecessor, just as Mr. Abe suffered from governing in the shadow of Mr. Koizumi. Just imagine the benefit to Mr. Fukuda's support if in the event of ministerial graft (or a ministerial gaffe) he were to act forcefully and quickly to demand accountability and dismiss the wrongdoer.

Meanwhile, Kyodo has come out with the first poll numbers for the Fukuda cabinet — 57.8% favorable. Not a bad position to be in as he readies himself for a clash with the DPJ.

From Team Abe to Team LDP

The first day of the Fukuda cabinet has passed, and the new prime minister has already put himself in about as advantageous a position as possible in light of the difficult circumstances in which he has taken office.

Criticism from the opposition and the media about the return of the factions notwithstanding, Mr. Fukuda has ensured that the party's respected elders are at his side, responsible for the government — they will not be sniping at him from the sidelines. While the question of the LDP's unruly conservative ideologues remains, in the meantime Mr. Fukuda has ensured that cabinet and party leadership will serve him. The Fukuda cabinet will not be characterized by a power vacuum at the top, unlike in the Abe cabinet. Significantly, the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), which has historically served as the primary organ by which backbenchers and zoku giin could exert bottom-up influence on policy making, is in the hands of Mr. Tanigaki, who is undoubtedly just grateful to be back in power after a year in the wilderness and thus will (gladly?) be taking marching orders from the prime minister.

So I have to disagree with Garrett DeOrio on this: the inclusion of faction chiefs is not automatically a bad thing. Indeed, for all the talk about the return of the factions, this argument seems odd in light of Mr. Fukuda's being the fourth consecutive prime minister from the Machimura faction. The inclusion of faction leaders in the cabinet might be more a sign of just how cheaply their support can be bought, rather than a sign of the undue influence the factions are prepared to wield over policy. (And it is necessary to recall that the factions have not historically been cohesive ideological units, being more about personal and monetary ties than about policy agendas — the zoku have been as or more important for policy making purposes.)

Meanwhile, he has made a wise choice in assembling his foreign policy team, shifting Mr. Komura from defense to foreign affairs and giving the defense portfolio to Ishiba Shigeru, defense policy wonk and JDA chief under Mr. Koizumi. With Mr. Ishiba's inclusion in the cabinet, the Fukuda cabinet now includes perhaps the two most prominent critics of Mr. Abe's decision to remain in office after the July landslide, the other being Mr. Masuzoe. If Mr. Fukuda is serious about sending a message that he recognizes the LDP's problems and seeks to learn from Mr. Abe's mistakes, including internal "dissidents" is a good way to start. Mr. Ishiba's appointment will undoubtedly also placate Washington, as Mr. Ishiba is a prominent but sensible advocate of closer US-Japan defense cooperation who pushed hard for a Japanese contribution to Iraqi reconstruction. (The US will also no doubt be pleased by Mr. Fukuda's intention to visit Washington in November, hopefully with a new anti-terror law in hand — or at least a new law in the pipeline.) When it comes to expertise on defense matters, Mr. Ishiba can go toe-to-toe with any of the DPJ's defense wonks, important considering that the point of contention this term is the anti-terror special measures law, a new version of which Mr. Fukuda intends to submit this Diet session. (And his being telegenic won't hurt the government's attempt to spin reports that the MSDF, in fact, assisted Operation Iraqi Freedom illegally.)

Beyond consolidating his support within the LDP, Mr. Fukuda has acted quickly to calm the fears of Komeito, the LDP's nervous coalition partner. Komeito's leadership is undoubtedly thrilled to see Mr. Abe replaced with Mr. Fukuda, seeing as how the former exposed the extent to which Komeito had sold out its principles for the sake of holding power with the LDP. Mr. Fukuda has agreed to support two legislative proposals favored by Komeito, a freeze on plans to raise the burden of elderly health care born by patients and a political funds law revision that makes it a requirement to attach all receipts for expenses exceeding one yen to funds reports (meaning that support for this version of the political funds control revision effectively has uniform support among the government coalition and the DPJ, although Mr. Ozawa took care to emphasize that the LDP has come along reluctantly). Whatever threat Komeito posed to the durability of the coalition under Mr. Abe has been more or less neutralized.

That leaves the DPJ. Mr. Ozawa has welcomed Mr. Fukuda to power by insisting once again that the House of Representatives should be dissolved and a general election held. Asked to comment on Mr. Fukuda, Mr. Ozawa said, "I have no comment on him as an individual. For the LDP-Komeito government, it will be the same whoever takes the place of prime minister. The continuation of LDP-Komeito government has meant the distortion of Japanese society, giving birth to injustice, inequality, and disparities in all areas." Should Mr. Fukuda's cabinet score highly in the polls that will be published any day now, however, the pressure on the DPJ to change its tune could become unbearable. The DPJ cannot rely on Mr. Fukuda to give them gifts in the manner that Mr. Abe's cabinet did. They will have to work on outfoxing their new opponent, because I don't think the rejectionist line will be sufficient in the face of a new prime minister who has acted quickly to neutralize (some but not all) potential enemies within the coalition and is now prepared to deal with the DPJ.

The restive right

In recent days I've argued that Japan watchers may soon find that Mr. Fukuda, who is ascending to the premiership with a hail of acclaim as a unity candidate, will turn out to be no such figure; he will likely face considerable opposition from within his own party.

As MTC notes in a brief but astute post, the meaningful division within the LDP — aside from urban-rural differences — is not along factional lines but along ideological lines (a division that to some extent follows generational lines). Except that there is little contest as to who holds the upper hand in the party: on social and foreign policy questions, the taka-ha (hawks) is in control.

The pragmatic Mr. Fukuda's surprising climb up the greasy pole notwithstanding, the LDP is increasingly an ideologically coherent party. As Richard Samuels and J. Patrick Boyd wrote in the monograph discussed in this post, the relegation of conservative ideologues to the LDP's anti-mainstream positions for the duration of the cold war (with few exceptions) has collapsed since the cold war's end, meaning that ideologically speaking, Mr. Fukuda and his hato-ha beliefs are actually anti-mainstream. He is only ascending to power today by virtue of a political crisis that has left the LDP paralyzed and scared, prompting the LDP's more moderate elders to turn to one of their own. As MTC notes, the hawkish youngsters did not feel the same, and gave Mr. Aso a surprisingly high tally in Sunday's presidential vote.

Komori Yoshihisa today provides another reminder that the ideologues and their allies in the media will not be forgiving of "lapses" by Mr. Fukuda. Mr. Komori digs up a record of a meeting between Mr. Fukuda and the abductee families after Mr. Koizumi's September 2002 visit to Pyongyang, when Mr. Fukuda was chief cabinet secretary, in which Mr. Fukuda apparently acted callous to the families. Just because Mr. Abe, an exemplary member of the young hawks, crashed and burned doesn't mean that the ideologues are marginalized — which means that the abductions issue, their pet issue, will not be abandoned without a fight.

How much slack will the restive ideologues give the pragmatic, flexible prime minister?

Yosano out, Machimura in

It looks like Mr. Mori will get his wish.

Mr. Fukuda, in advance of his assumption of the premiership, has named Machimura Nobutaka to the post of chief cabinet secretary. Readers will recall that Mr. Mori was insistent during August that Mr. Abe named Mr. Machimura to the post of chief cabinet secretary, unsolicited advice that Mr. Abe chose to ignore.

As expected, Mr. Mori will once again be a force to be reckoned within the party — and that's probably not a good thing for anyway.

Mr. Machimura's promotion means that, as Jun Okumura notes, the foreign affairs portfolio is free for Mr. Aso to reclaim it, provided that Mr. Fukuda — and his backers — want to reward Mr. Aso with such a high profile post, especially given the differences in how each man thinks Japan should deal with North Korea. For my part, I'll be surprised if Mr. Aso returns to the Foreign Ministry, not least because he has adamantly rejected the idea of taking a major cabinet portfolio.