The Yomiuri Shimbun reports (article in Japanese) that former JDA Director-General Nukaga Fukushiro gave a talk at a Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation) symposium on North Korea's nuclear test and East Asian security. In his remarks, Mr. Nukaga asked: "If North Korea decided to use force and fired a Nodong at Japan, which American warships then shot down, would the constitution problem be a good reason to remain indifferent to using our Aegis cruisers to shoot down a Taepodong 2 fired at the United States?" Thus he calls for an end to the constitutional interpretation that prohibits Japan from exercising its right to collective self-defense. He rightly suggests that doing so need not obligate Japan to collaborate in every US campaign around the world -- Japan can set limits to what it can do and can't do (as it's always done). He insists that the main focus on US-Japan security cooperation must be in situations in areas surrounding Japan.
More controversially, in his remarks Mr. Nukaga called for Japan to investigate whether it should develop a Tomahawk-like cruise missile that would enable it to strike at "enemy bases" (presumably meaning North Korean bases).
There are several problems with this idea. The first is technical. Would a Japanese strike force actually be useful as a deterrent given that North Korea's intermediate-range Nodong missiles -- the missiles that pose a major risk to Japan -- are launched with difficult-to-locate mobile launchers and can be fueled on a short notice? (For more on North Korea's missile, see this March 2006 report [pdf] from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.)
The second problem would be the impact of an independent Japanese conventional deterrent on alliance cooperation with the US. In terms of defense industrial cooperation, would Raytheon, current manufacturer of the Tomahawk, assent to Japan's developing its own cruise missile instead of buying off the shelf from Raytheon? (This question is of particular interest because the president of Raytheon's international division is Torkel Patterson, a Japan expert who was head of Asian affairs at the National Security Council early in the Bush administration.)
More fundamentally, how would an independent Japanese deterrent affect US deployments in Japan? Would Japanese cruise missiles make a forward-deployed US conventional deterrent unnecessary?
The third problem is the impact on the region. Japan would have a hard time convincing its neighbors that its cruise missiles are strictly defensive, and thus a cruise missile program would risk contributing to arms race with China and South Korea, not to mention North Korea. This latter difficulty is the least significant -- Japan cannot predicate its security policy on what its neighbors might do in response -- but at the same time it is not an irrelevant consideration.
Of course, all of this is speculative, because Japan still has a long way to go before it will be in a position to deploy an independent deterrent. For the moment, the big question remains how Japan would pay for such a deterrent, and whether the Diet would cough up the money even if it were available. I have my doubts.
At the same time, remarks like Mr. Nukaga's are encouraging, because it means that Japanese leaders are at least thinking and talking about Japanese defense policy and how it should change as the regional and international environments change. A "normal" Japan is impossible without a sophisticated national conversation on security policy.
More controversially, in his remarks Mr. Nukaga called for Japan to investigate whether it should develop a Tomahawk-like cruise missile that would enable it to strike at "enemy bases" (presumably meaning North Korean bases).
There are several problems with this idea. The first is technical. Would a Japanese strike force actually be useful as a deterrent given that North Korea's intermediate-range Nodong missiles -- the missiles that pose a major risk to Japan -- are launched with difficult-to-locate mobile launchers and can be fueled on a short notice? (For more on North Korea's missile, see this March 2006 report [pdf] from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.)
The second problem would be the impact of an independent Japanese conventional deterrent on alliance cooperation with the US. In terms of defense industrial cooperation, would Raytheon, current manufacturer of the Tomahawk, assent to Japan's developing its own cruise missile instead of buying off the shelf from Raytheon? (This question is of particular interest because the president of Raytheon's international division is Torkel Patterson, a Japan expert who was head of Asian affairs at the National Security Council early in the Bush administration.)
More fundamentally, how would an independent Japanese deterrent affect US deployments in Japan? Would Japanese cruise missiles make a forward-deployed US conventional deterrent unnecessary?
The third problem is the impact on the region. Japan would have a hard time convincing its neighbors that its cruise missiles are strictly defensive, and thus a cruise missile program would risk contributing to arms race with China and South Korea, not to mention North Korea. This latter difficulty is the least significant -- Japan cannot predicate its security policy on what its neighbors might do in response -- but at the same time it is not an irrelevant consideration.
Of course, all of this is speculative, because Japan still has a long way to go before it will be in a position to deploy an independent deterrent. For the moment, the big question remains how Japan would pay for such a deterrent, and whether the Diet would cough up the money even if it were available. I have my doubts.
At the same time, remarks like Mr. Nukaga's are encouraging, because it means that Japanese leaders are at least thinking and talking about Japanese defense policy and how it should change as the regional and international environments change. A "normal" Japan is impossible without a sophisticated national conversation on security policy.
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